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Two years ago, a group of Fordham law students approached some
of my colleagues and I inquiring why there was not a course on critical
race theory ("CRT") listed in the Spring schedule of classes. The
students were ethnically and racially varied, but all had either
previously been exposed to CRT or possessed a deep curiosity about
what it might teach them. Much of what was driving their angst about
the absence of the course on the schedule was the prospect that the
third years among them would soon graduate without a deeper
understanding of what they considered to be a crucial area of legal
thought and analysis. The passion with which these students corralled
a group of five or so faculty members to teach the course on
"overload" was both inspiring and vindicatory of CRT's ascent into
legal theory and education over the past two decades a
Inspiring as this incident was, it has become juxtaposed in my mind
with a series of conversations I have had over the years with students
exposed to CRT who wonder poignantly about the reach of legal
theory (both generally, and specifically in the case of CRT) into their
post-graduate professional lives. In different but recurring ways, I
have been asked the same questions over and over again. What,
exactly, are students to draw from the piercing insights of critical
theory that can guide them in their professional roles, identities, and
choices? How do the tenets and methodology of CRT translate into
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law. I extend my gratitude to Russell Pearce for initiating the
idea for the conference and helping to bring it to life through our many brainstorming
sessions. I also deeply appreciate the commitment and generosity of Dean William
Treanor and Associate Dean Matthew Diller in supporting the work of the Stein
Center and this conference.
1. See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Critical Race Theory: Cases, Materials and
Problems (2003); Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995); Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement
(Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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tools that legal practitioners can draw upon to improve the conditions
of the very subjects about which we have written so eloquently? I
have often struggled to come up with a fully satisfactory response to
these inquiries.
Most of us writing and teaching in this area would agree that CRT is
largely about the framing and analysis of legal (and social) questions
concerning race, and racial subjects, in a manner that jettisons existing
frameworks and proposes alternative ways of analyzing the same
questions and problems. If this is correct, then exposure to the theory
itself arguably enables our students to enter the world of practice with
a self-consciously critical lens through which to approach issues of
racial (in)justice. In doing so we hope they can eventually train our
legal system to ask and answer these issues in the ways that legal
theorists have taught them, thereby transforming the norms
underlying our approach to, and adjudication of, deeply entrenched
social and legal problems faced by people of color.
I doubt, however, the self-obviousness of the connection between
theory and practice -in particular, the myriad ways that critical theory
can be applied to the problems of individuals and communities of
color. Too often connecting the dots, so to speak, requires the kind of
learning by osmosis for which practitioners rarely have time. While
theorists may recognize the barriers to, and the difficulty of, law
reform, we may at the same time underestimate or unwittingly
discount (perhaps because many of us no longer practice) the
craftsmanship necessary to effectively employ legal rules and legal
theory to achieve racial equality and/or the analytical tools required to
navigate around (or jettison altogether) the rules that we adjudge to
have created (or further exacerbated) existing racial inequalities. And
even when we identify novel, transgressive approaches to achieving
racial justice within the legal system, we may overlook deeper ethical
implications of such solutions. In short, many of us have been too
deeply ensconced in the theory to pay much attention to the "praxis."2
The Symposium on Critical Race Lawyering held here at Fordham
University School of Law on November 5, 2004 was designed as a
meditation on the relationship between race theory and legal practice.
Beyond the interrogative ways that theorists have critiqued legal
doctrines and principles that characterize mainstream legal thought,
what else do we have to offer our students (and practitioners exposed
to the literature) about how to be "critical race lawyers," or to engage
in "critical race lawyering" where appropriate? Using race as a
primary lens of examination, participants set out to think through
2. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 874 (1997)
(suggesting more "reflective action" by scholars, lawyers, and community activists,
involving an infusion of on-the-ground practice with aspects of critical inquiry and
pragmatism and then a recasting of theory in light of practical experience).
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some of the insights that CRT has offered (or could offer) us in the
context of our professional roles, advocacy strategies, and lawyering
goals. The underlying premise of the symposium was to make explicit
the connection between theory and practice, to highlight areas where
that connection has already been made by scholars, and to identify
areas where more inquiry and creative thinking might further push the
theory into action.
In this Foreword, I want to discuss three areas that might define the
contours of critical race lawyering and ways in which CRT has, and
could continue to, illuminate the connection between theory and
practice.
I. PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES AND ROLES: COMMON, BUT
DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES
A starting point in thinking critically about race and lawyering is to
acknowledge our enduring racial "separatism."3  The racial
stratification that marks many of our lives invariably influences the
motivations and interests of students entering law school and
enduringly shapes their professional values, identities, and roles once
they leave law school. In other words, race is a powerfully salient
factor whose influence we cannot escape largely because of its deep
mark on our lives and the lives of those around us. In other words, we
experience constant reminders of how much race still matters in
almost every context of our personal and professional lives. This
observation may be so reflexively obvious that some have become
indifferent to it. But it is nevertheless worth emphasizing the ways
that race deeply impacts the shape and texture of some of our most
common professional dilemmas, particularly for lawyers of color.
My experience as a young litigator at a large law firm many years
ago reflects one such dilemma common among attorneys of color in
private practice. Shortly after joining the firm, I was placed on a case
that in many ways was a novice lawyer's dream. The firm had taken
over a class action case against our client, one of the largest insurance
companies in the nation, from another large firm after the
unsuccessful litigation of the claim in federal court. Our client had
lost the liability portion of the case at trial and now needed our firm to
litigate the damages portion. Our firm's work would involve
determining which of the over 1000 plaintiffs in the class actually
suffered from the illegal behavior that the trial court had determined
our client systematically engaged in. This latter part of the case
3. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, The Failures of Integration: How Race and Class
Are Undermining the American Dream x-xix (2004) (noting the fact that five decades
after the death of legal segregation, our neighborhoods and schools remain racially
identifiable, and describing the tremendous economic and social consequences of that
segregation for individuals and communities of color).
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promised each of us on the litigation team the type of experience most
large firm litigators do not experience for years into their practice.
We would be deposing each individual plaintiff, defending the
deposition of hundreds of our client's employees, and arguing motions
before special federal magistrates on each plaintiff's claim. The
experience was invaluable from the standpoint of a first year
associate.
The problem, from my vantage point, was that the case was a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
well as perhaps the largest class action sex discrimination claim ever
brought under the statute. Our firm's task was to reduce the
company's damages by demonstrating the spurious nature of each
class plaintiff's-each woman's-discrimination claim. This often
involved making a case that she was not really "interested" in being
hired by the company because she was otherwise engaged in
household or mothering work, or otherwise unavailable for the
opportunity from which she claimed to have been deterred or denied.
I found many of our litigation strategies problematic in that they
seemed to reinforce the very social and institutional barriers that Title
VII was designed to dismantle.4 Nevertheless, our strategies, to my
discomfort, were overwhelmingly successful in denying recovery to
many of the women in the class.
But my ethical dilemma posed more personal challenges. As a
preliminary matter, I was curiously aware of the fact that the head of
our litigation team for this case was a relatively young female partner,
as were a significant number of associates placed on the team. I was,
however, the only person of color on the team, though the firm had an
uncommonly significant number of associates and partners of color,
particularly African-Americans.5  I speculated that perhaps the
healthy representation of women on the litigation team was reflective
simply of the fact that some of the best young litigators at the firm
were women. Perhaps our client had chosen the firm and/or the
litigation partner because of this diversity, a fact that could only signal
its egalitarian nature and benefit it in front of the special masters that
would determine critical procedural and substantive matters in the
case.6 The expressive nature of our team's gender (and perhaps
4. See, e.g., Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749 (1990) (applying a critical analysis of
federal courts' acceptance of claims that a particular social group is underrepresented
because of their lack of interest, particularly where that group has previously faced
overt discriminatory barriers to entry).
5. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 493
(1996).
6. The choice of an attorney who shares the plaintiff's racial or gender identity in
discrimination cases is a strategic tactic often employed to make the defendant look
[Vol. 732030
CRITICAL RACE LAWYERING
ethnic) makeup was clearly potent, even though I was not sure what
exact message it was intended to convey.
My identity as an African-American attorney, however, had its
own, unmistakable ethical dimensions. Working on the case
constantly evoked the stories I had heard from my parents,
grandparents, and extended family members about life in the
segregated South and the valiant efforts of everyday African-
Americans and their leaders in the civil rights movement to instigate
social change and achieve racial equality. One of the shining
accolades of their efforts was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, of which Title VII is the most litigated section. It seemed that
the nature of my work on the discrimination case, particularly some of
our litigation strategies, was undermining the very law (and social
movement) largely responsible for many of the opportunities I now
enjoyed as an African-American. I also felt a very strong allegiance to
my foremothers' and forefathers' efforts to bring about this law. In
my mind, I was a traitor to their efforts and to the cause of racial
justice. In other words, I did not feel I had the luxury to check my
racial identity at the door. Instead, it and the history that surrounded
it were constantly perched on my shoulder interrogating my
professional values and choices throughout the case.'
Although I expressed my personal and professional concerns and
dilemmas to the partner on the case, she had no real guidance on how
I might negotiate them, aside from her general sense that I was being
naive about the sincerity and veracity of many of the plaintiffs' claims.
In other words, she sincerely believed we were engaged in a truth-
seeking enterprise, one that would ultimately vindicate our aggressive
litigation strategies. I believed, on the other hand, that I was
betraying principles and histories that could not be rehabilitated when
less culpable. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, The Good Black: A True Story of Race in
America 166-67 (1999). Barrett describes, in a race discrimination claim by a
Harvard-trained black lawyer against his law firm, how
[t]he defense side had grown worried about pale Michael Warner [one of the
firm's lawyers] standing in front of a predominantly black Washington jury,
questioning [plaintiff's] character and veracity. So [the firm] launched a
search for a local black lawyer willing to lend his or her complexion to the
defendants' cause.
Id.
7. See Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black
Attorneys and the Straightjacket of Legal Practice, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 766, 772 (1997).
The author notes:
Unlike white attorneys, who have the relatively luxurious comfort of
invisibility and transparency in raising issues of race in the lawyering
process, Black attorneys must always brace themselves to have their racial,
professional, and personal identities placed in issue as well. This additional
layer of scrutiny and suspicion may in turn raise for the Black attorney




this truth-seeking mission was completed. In the end, neither she nor
I was able to reconcile our competing ethical stances. Ultimately, I
resigned from the litigation team, the case, and the law firm,
notwithstanding her admonition that I was being "unprofessional."
I am certain that many of my colleagues at the firm would have
agreed with the partner and also considered my objections and
abandonment of the case "unprofessional." Perhaps they would have
been right as a matter of professional ethics, at least in the formal
sense of that term under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
But I certainly did not view myself as possessing a realistic, accessible
framework in which to resolve our competing claims and conceptions
of professionalism.
Many of us intuitively acknowledge through experiences like mine
that our current norms of professionalism do not adequately account
for the professional and ethical challenges confronting lawyers of
color and/or involving the representation of clients of color. This is
particularly the case in the criminal justice system.8 As critical race
scholars have noted, ethical dilemmas faced by attorneys of color are
often ones that place our racial identities in conflict with normative
ethical standards that demand a "bleached out professionalism"-
requiring us to shed our religious, gender, and racial identities and
loyalties in the service of universal professional norms like
"neutrality" and "objectivity. '
Although the work of these scholars was not available (or at least
not known to me) at the time that I was struggling through my
professional dilemma, such work would have provided me with an
analysis that took my nonprofessional loyalties and obligations
seriously and a language through which to resolve my competing
allegiances. I would have discovered that, luckily, there need not be
such a nonnegotiable conflict between the identities of black and
lawyer; that indeed it is possible to retain one's racial identity and the
historical and social obligations attendant to it without unduly
constraining one's professional roles and obligations. 10
8. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence 95, Colum. L. Rev.
1301 (1996); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995); Russell, supra note 7.
9. David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional
Responsibility, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1502, 1504-05, 1517-25 (1998) (discussing the work of
Margaret Russell, Anthony Alfieri, Robin Barnes and others).
10. Id. at 1506-07. The author defines a role for an "obligation thesis" that
"neither turns black lawyers into racial patriots whose sole responsibility.., is to be
an 'interpreter and proponent of [black] rights and aspirations,' nor treats racial
obligations as 'personal' commitments," but instead allows for the negotiation of
three "semi-autonomous" and, ultimately, "secondary" moral realms: the
"professional," representing the legitimate moral demands emanating from the norms
and practices of the legal profession; the "obligation thesis," representing the
legitimate moral claims emanating from a black lawyer's membership in the black
community; and the "personal," representing the unique desires and commitments
[Vol. 732032
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II. LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: REPOSITIONING THE PROFESSIONAL
SUBJECT
There are other ways that our professional identities serve as a
straightjacket, confining us to learned modes of analysis and static
professional roles that are ill-suited to identifying the most effective
and innovative solutions to contemporary problems of race. Lawyers
are trained to be problem-solvers and, as such, have held an exalted
position in bringing to bear solutions to the problems of marginalized
communities and individuals. We have often done so by invoking the
discourse of rights and rights-based remedies. Legal rights, as critical
race scholars have elegantly argued, have historically been an
effective and faithfully relied upon form of legal discourse and
strategy for African-Americans and other historically subordinated
groups."
At the same time, the uncritical pursuit of rights-based strategies
and discourse has sometimes situated lawyers in positions that created
conflicts of interest vis-A-vis these communities. Derek Bell long ago
criticized civil rights lawyers for subordinating the interests of their
clients, black segregated communities, to the interests of elite liberal
public interest lawyers.' 2 Integration, he argued, may have served
certain legal ideals, but ultimately fell short in addressing the material
inequalities of the communities themselves. While these lawyers
zealously pursued the goal of school integration, they largely ignored
suggestions from local communities that school equality would be
better served by hiring blacks in top positions in the school system,
improving black schools' resources, and including more black parent
participation in school policymaking. The need to recognize and
respect the legal rights that African-Americans and others have
gained has often obscured the need for pragmatic problem-solving
approaches to contemporary racial problems. This is particularly true
in an environment characterized by the waning of the political will, or
taste, for racially conscious or class-based remedies that characterized
that black lawyers have in virtue of their basic humanity. Id.; see also Russell G.
Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A
Challenge and an Invitation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 127, 154-56 (2004) (explaining
that ethics rules permit lawyers to take account of considerations such as religion in
client representation).
11. Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 149 (1991). The author
notes that:
The vocabulary of rights speaks to an establishment that values the guise of
stability, and from whom social change for the better must come (whether it
is given, taken, or smuggled). Change argued for in the sheep's clothing of
stability ("rights") can be effective, even as it destabilizes certain other
establishment values (segregation). The subtlety of rights' real instability
thus does not render unusable their persona of stability.
Id.
12. Derek A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976).
2005] 2033
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the civil rights era of the past four decades.13 One need only examine
the history of court-arbitrated school desegregation to understand the
limits of rights-based strategies and even of lawyers' agency in
bringing about structural and social change through the courts.
Indeed, the re-segregation of schools that has occurred is in large part
due to the functioning of forces (like housing mobility and white
flight) that the Court had placed outside of the scope of the legal right
recognized in Brown v. Board of Education.14
A central tenet of CRT has been that our current judicial (and
political) system is highly deferential to the social, economic, and
political agents (or causes) of racial inequality while at the same time
ever-scrutinizing of efforts to address that inequality through official
race-conscious means.15 Scholars have recast contemporary racial
disadvantage as not the product of conscious, intentional racism but
rather a result of historically stable and deep cognitive and structural
causes that legal doctrine has become increasingly unwilling to
address. This de-centers, in obvious ways, the places and persons to
whom we look for solutions for racial subjects living at the vortex of
our legal, social, and political reality.
Simply put, the locus of solutions to some of our most entrenched
racial problems is increasingly neither found in the courts, nor
necessarily with the rights-based approaches that lawyers are apt to
take (and sometimes clients request lawyers to pursue). Rather, some
of the most innovative solutions to racial injustice and disadvantage
are distributed in a variety of places throughout our legal, social, and
political systems.16 While we are used to looking for alternative
doctrinal approaches to "righting wrongs" of racially marginalized
13. Introduction, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the
Movement, supra note 1, at xxxii (noting that our current political era "mark[s] the
rejection of the always fragile civil rights consensus and the renunciation by federal,
state, and city authorities [indeed, of the American people themselves] that
government not only can but must play an active role in identifying and eradicating
racial injustice").
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
15. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than
Race": The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 2003 U. I11. L. Rev. 615.
16. See Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering (1993). This client or community
empowerment theory of lawyering of course applies to larger social and legal issues
beyond those concerning racial subordination. Poverty law scholarship has put front
and center the empowerment of marginalized clients in contexts ranging from
immigrant workers to welfare recipients to communities fighting disproportionate
environmental hazard exposure. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to
Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 Ecology
L.Q. 619 (1992); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, The Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 407 (1995); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
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individuals and groups, 7 we might also think as creatively about
approaches to remedies that are grounded in the particulars of the
lives and communities for whom we write and theorize.
Critical race scholars engaged in pursuing and examining remedial
approaches like racial reparations, truth and reconciliation
commissions, and the re-litigation of dormant racial injustices from a
critical perspective are fully engaged in the type of creative problem-
solving work grounded in the material and collective needs of the
racially disenfranchised.18  These scholars usefully facilitate
substantive remedies for harms that cannot be atomized in our legal
system through the discourse or adjudication of rights. Instead, they
acknowledge the systemic and cumulative nature of racial harms, in
line with critical theory, while creating legal structures of
accountability for public and private wrongdoing. 9 In doing so, these
scholars are timely and wise to take seriously the experience of
lawyers and policymakers in other countries with similar, though not
identical, histories of racial oppression.2 °
III. IN THE COURTROOM AND ON THE GROUND: LAWYERING IN
THE SHADOW OF LEGAL THEORY
The crux of my students' questions about the reach of legal theory
prompts the query that underlies much of what seems to be embedded
in the link between theory and practice. That is, how do we employ
all of the wonderful critiques and reconstructive analyses that CRT
has bestowed upon us in the course of representing the individuals
17. See Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA. L. Rev. 815, 833-34 (1990)
(discussing the efforts of some lawyers in the United States to look beyond civil rights
to international human rights laws for solutions to racial problems); see also William
M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling,
39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Interracial Justice: Conflict & Reconciliation in
Post-Civil Rights America (1999) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Interracial Justice];
Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1141 (2003); Sherrilyn A. Ifill,
Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 Law & Ineq. 263
(2003); Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 Mich.
L. Rev. 1225 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial-
Again: African-American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101
Mich. L. Rev. 1269 (2003) [hereinafter Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice].
19. See, e.g., Yamamoto, Interracial Justice, supra note 18; Alfieri, supra note 18;
Ifill, supra note 18; Russell, supra note 18; Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice,
supra note 18.
20. "LatCrit," or latino critical theory, scholars-a descendant of CRT-have
been particularly careful to employ comparative analysis to both analyze and theorize
about racial problems and their potential remedial solutions. See, e.g., Tanya Katerf
Herndndez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87 Cornell L.
Rev. 1093 (2002); Celina Romany & Joon-Beom Chu, Affirmative Action in
International Human Rights Law: A Critical Perspective of Its Normative
Assumptions, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 831 (2004).
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and communities who are the subjects of our analysis? I have faced
this question directly in the lawyering work I do, outside of the
academy, representing communities and grassroots groups fighting for
environmental justice.2' The challenge for me has been to translate
the insights of critical race theorists into practical strategies that
simultaneously circumvent problematic legal doctrines and
frameworks while fully taking advantage of the analytical tools at my
disposal.
Consider the problem of environmental racism, understood as the
disproportionate distribution of environmentally harmful substances
(such as lead) and land uses (such as hazardous waste facilities) in
communities of color. As with most adverse racially disparate
outcomes across a spectrum of social contexts and goods, there is no
clear perpetrator or encompassing theory of causation that explains
these outcomes. Indeed, as I have argued, these outcomes are best
understood as yet another manifestation of the racism and
discrimination that exists throughout our social structure-in housing
discrimination, political disenfranchisement, and lack of access to
health care and other social amenities.22
Environmental justice scholars and advocates have thus heeded the
teachings of critical race scholars that current jurisprudential
understandings render invisible many contemporary forms of racial
discrimination and shield them from judicial scrutiny. This is
especially true for civil rights claims, one of the key tools at our
disposal for addressing such discrimination. 23 Rejecting a color-blind
approach to assessing the causes of disproportionate impacts of
environmental hazards on communities of color, we have steadfastly
discounted race-neutral explanations for disproportionately adverse
environmental and health outcomes while offering a causal analysis
which accounts for the ways in which racially infected social structures
produce those outcomes.24
21. See generally Luke W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up:
Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement (2001).
22. Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20
Ecology L.Q. 721, 735 (1993).
23. For instance, the intent doctrine in equal protection law conceives racism as a
"discrete and identifiable act of 'prejudice based on skin color"' and, thus, "place[s]
virtually the entire range of everyday social practices in America-social practices
[that were] developed and maintained throughout the period of formal American
apartheid-beyond the scope of critical examination or legal remediation."
Introduction, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement,
supra note 1, at xxviii. Similarly, "the contemporary 'jurisprudence of colorblindness'
[is] not only the expression of a particular color-consciousness, but the product of a
deeply politicized choice" which operates to "obscure [the law's] active role in
sustaining hierarchies of racial power." Id.
24. See, e.g., Cole & Foster, supra note 21, at 70-74 (explaining how race-neutral
criteria used by government and industry for siting hazardous waste facilities turn out
not to be race-neutral after all, when seen in their social and historical context);
Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. Colo. L.
2036 [Vol. 73
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Armed with this analysis, which the community-based groups I have
worked with understand and can articulate without my assistance, it
was not always clear to me how I might best (re)present the
grievances of these communities in judicial or other policymaking
forums that, as critical race scholars have argued, are currently hostile
to these claims.2 .5 It is not surprising that claims of environmental
racism do not, and have not, fit into existing judicial and legal
understandings of race discrimination given their emphasis on clearly
identifiable perpetrators and/or conscious bias.26  Given the
inadequacy of civil rights and equality doctrines to address the
conditions complained of, what skills might the lawyer seeking to
assist these communities bring to the table? How might we promote
the understanding of their claims as ones involving racial
discrimination, as opposed to a "not in my backyard" rejection of
unwanted land uses? Did, or could, critical race analysis impart any
tools in the absence of the doctrine it has steadfastly discounted as
useful to addressing structurally rooted problems like environmental
racism?
One of the gifts that CRT has imparted to those who study its
methodology is the importance of narrative to understanding the
nature of contemporary racial injustice and subordination.27 While
the use of narratives describing experiences of racial subjects has been
a sharply criticized feature of critical theory, 8 in practice narratives
represent one of the primary ways in which critical theory has
invariably shaped lawyering on behalf of disadvantaged communities
and groups. It has done so by giving those of us working on behalf of
these communities an empowering tool, not dependent upon limited
legal and doctrinal frameworks, that displaces the dominant narratives
of racism as discrete, isolated, and/or intentional incidents and
outcomes. Narratives allow us to relate the story of our client's harms
in ways that they experience and understand and in doing so to
identify the systemic nature of those harms and its causes. These
narratives, while often insufficient to give rise to legal causes of action,
Rev. 839, 840 (1992) (noting that scholars are "analyzing environmental policies and
activities from the perspective of their subordinating impact on racial groups" along
with challenging the "substantive distributional impact of those rules in practice and
the substantive blindness in the production of rules that lead to racially subordinating
activities," whether intentional or not).
25. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 15; Sheila R. Foster, Causation in
Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent and Impact, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1469 (2005)
(illustrating the erosion of normative assumptions underlying the proof structures in
intentional and disparate impact claims which make these claims unlikely to succeed).
26. See Cole & Foster, supra note 21, at 63-65 (reviewing unsuccessful cases).
27. Two classic examples of this form of the theory are Williams, supra note 11,
and Derek Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice
(1987).
28. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971
(1991) (analyzing critical race and feminist narratives and addressing the critiques).
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can be very useful in building social movements, as well as raising the
profile of, and educating policymakers and the public about, the
nature of issues like environmental racism.
This client-centered, narrative approach has guided those of us
working in the environmental justice field. Among the central tenets
of environmental justice lawyering, and the movement itself, is the
idea that "We Speak for Ourselves" -that those impacted by and
experiencing environmental racism speak in their own voice. This
tenet, of necessity, resituates lawyers to a subordinate, but
collaborative, position in the problem-solving exercise. As the
literature reflects, lawyers and legal scholars have recounted the
stories of these communities as a way of articulating the social,
economic and legal forces that have given rise to racially
disproportionate outcomes.29 And we have done so in a way that
hews faithfully to these communities' own conceptions of the causes
and impacts of the injustice they suffer.
This is not to say that lawsuits and other traditional legal tools, like
civil rights litigation, are not useful or employed in this context. To
the contrary, civil rights lawsuits can have ancillary benefits even
where they are destined or predicted to be unsuccessful. Such
lawsuits can be part of the reframing of a dispute as one presumed to
have nothing to do with race to one where race is a central feature of
the alleged harms.30 But a narrative, client-driven approach displaces
the lawyer and overly technical legal solutions as the main remedy
29. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 16; Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City:
Lessons for the Movement, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 67 (1994); Sheila Foster,
Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 775,
775 (1998) (recounting the story and struggles of a community-based environmental
justice group in Chester, Pennsylvania to "provide a window into the social relations
and processes underlying distributive inequities and ... assist reformers in identifying
the types of policy reforms likely to help achieve environmental justice").
30. For example, in the environmental justice context:
[B]ringing a civil rights lawsuit against local government officials can be very
satisfying for the community group involved, because it calls the problem
what it is: a violation of civil rights. This "naming names" has many
advantages. It is one high-profile way of saying that the official being sued is
engaging in unjust practices. This act alone makes such suits worth it to
some groups with long-term experiences with decision makers- []filing a suit
allows a community to say "officially" what has existed for a long time and
builds morale within the group. Additionally, by calling an environmental
dispute by a different name-a civil rights dispute-a community group can
educate its members, politicians, and other communities. It may help local
residents, decision makers, and company officials see the problem
differently. More importantly, renaming the problem raises the
consciousness of the general public about the issue of environmental racism.
By calling a dispute a civil rights struggle, a group may also find allies in
more traditional civil rights groups in its region that may not have
recognized the civil rights implications of the struggle for environmental
justice.
Cole & Foster, supra note 21, at 130.
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pursued by aggrieved clients. Rather, lawyers become part and parcel
of a larger remedial and liberatory project that reveals an array of
potential legal and nonlegal strategies to improve the conditions of
the community and transform the responsible political and social
structures. This approach is one that is not new to critical race
scholars,31 but one that should be replicated in a broader array of
fields and across different social contexts.
CONCLUSION
The Symposium at Fordham University School of Law on CRT set
out to continue the task of putting theory into action or practice. The
scholars and practitioners in attendance acknowledged the important
contribution that critical race theory has made to our professional and
ethical development. At the same time, we know that there is more
work to be done to situate more centrally its critical impulses and
liberating methodology into the lawyering work that is done on behalf
of our subjects. Like CRT itself, this undertaking will surely be
arduous and contested in a professional world driven by faith in the
objectivity and neutrality of legal roles and rules. But the pursuit of
this goal-placing our theory in the service of our practice-will open
the doors to pathways we have yet to discover-but must-if we are
to remain faithful to the project of racial justice.
31. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 8. Paul Butler has cleverly advocated the limited,
selective use of legal jury nullification techniques to send criminally culpable black
men back to their communities which are best able to rehabilitate them. See id.
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